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Notes
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-FAMILY COURTS
The Problem
The incidence of family breakdown in the United States is a
phenomenon that draws forth proposal after proposal for reform in
marriage and divorce laws.' Whether or not a high divorce rate in-
dicates a rise in marriage instability is however, questionable. It may
well be that the percentage of unstable marriages is the same as ever,
but that more couples now choose to go to court for a decree. This
would seem to be the natural result of the fact that divorce, in the
last twenty years, has lost a great deal of its previous social stigma.-
Simple population increase, too, will bring more divorce business
before the existing courts without disturbing the percentage figures.
Although it is surely untrue that divorce is the proper solution for
every ailing marriage, it is the contention of the writer that divorce
has its legitimate place when applied to otherwise incurable mar-
riage breakdowns. Admittedly, the present method of application
leaves much to be desired, but the usual proposals for divorce-law
reform are far too naive and superficial to operate as a remedy. At
one time they may seek to make divorce almost impossible to obtain
by restricting the legal grounds for divorce to an extreme. At other
times they may seek to make it a matter of right by permitting divorce
for "incompatibility" or even mutual consent.3
The effect of strict divorce law on marriages which should be
dissolved is to force the parties to one of two evils-either suffer in
silence or manufacture grounds.4 Extremely liberal grounds, however,
result in routine granting of decrees without proper investigation of
the marriages involved. If a husband and wife say that they are in-
compatible, their testimony cannot well be disputed because the word
is too vague and all-encompassing to be subject to disproof. Mutual
consent under the liberal view, of course, makes divorce easier to get
than a driver's license; in effect, no grounds at all are required.
I Baber, Marriage and the Family 443 (1953); Johnstone, The Place of the
Legal System in Marital Discord Cases, 31 Ore. L. Rev. 297 (1952).2 Baber, supra Note 1 at 443-44.
3 Johnstone, supra Note 1 at 311.
4 Infra Note 6.
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Neither of these reforms is apt to have any real effect on the
divorce rate or the situations of marital discord giving rise to divorce.
In New York, where the only ground for absolute divorce is adultery,
the courts have stretched the remedy of annullment to grandiose pro-
portions in order to dissolve marriages that would be terminated by
divorce in other states.5 Collusion, too, is common. 6 The effect of
establishing incompatibility as a ground for divorce, as has been done
in New Mexico and Alaska, 7 is merely to accomplish by legislative
action what has been done for years by collusion between the parties.
The fact is that courts today have very little influence on the question
whether a divorce shall or shall not be granted. On the average,
divorces are granted within ten minutes after the judge receives the
case. Real contests are rare, and the courts seldom make adequate
inquiries. 8
One reason for this situation is that divorces are handled like tort
or criminal actions-by the traditional adversary method of proceeding.
The criterion for awarding the decree is the fault of one of the parties
in committing an act in violation of the marriage contract. Certain
grounds consisting of such violations are set out by statute. One party
files an ordinary lawsuit, alleging the commission of such an act, and
if the other party does not present a proper defense, the decree is
usually granted. Theoretically, if the grounds are manufactured the
suit will be dismissed, but if both parties desire the divorce the court
will not be told of collusion. The adversary system presupposes two
adverse parties with adverse interests. Most divorce suits involve
parties who are adverse only to each other, but have a common in-
terest in procuring a divorce as quickly as possible. The truth, in the
usual case, does not emerge.
Thus, it seems that neither liberality nor strictness in grounds for
divorce has much effect as "reform". Liberalization does, however,
5 Baber, supra Note 1 at 519.6 Id. at 478.
"It is an open secret that in certain states having very strict divorce
laws collusion is a dreary commonplace . . . reporters get weary of
the unimaginative sameness of the testimony, and even the judges, at
first indignant, then disusted, find themselves granting decree after
decree in cases where they are ... sure .. .that the most brazen
collusion is being practiced. In New York, where adultery is the only
ground for absolute divorce, the story of the plaintiff's lawyer has so
little variation that certain judges claim they can take it up at any
point and complete it, knowing just where the "blonde in a night-
gown" will appear. One New York judge has a leaflet specially pre-
pared to expedite uncontested divorce suits. The referee admonishes
the attorney to "use the book" when he inadvertently asks some
usual but not entirely necessary question."7 Johnstone, supra Note 1 at 312.
8 Id. at 298, 299.
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have the attribute of honesty, in that it brings the grounds for divorce
closer to the actual causes.
What is needed is not merely liberality or strictness in divorce
laws, but the end of fault as the basis for family dissolution and the
establishment of a method which will bring before the court a true
picture of the family problem in each individual case. The emphasis
should be placed on the question of whether divorce is the proper
solution for a given case rather than on the question of whether one
of the parties has slighted the other. The court, in the interest of the
state, must take a more active part in bringing about the proper con-
clusion in divorce cases, on the theory that the state is a third party
to the marriage contract and the society in general has a much deeper
interest in divorce cases than in ordinary contract litigation. Other-
wise, the adversary system leaves a gap in divorce litigation and the
interest of the third party state is not adequately served. It is this gap
that family courts are designed to fill.
What is a Family Court?
A family court differs from the ordinary court in three particulars:
(1) It is integrated. This means that it has exclusive jurisdiction of all
justiciable problems which arise in a given family out of the intra-
familial relationship. (2) Whereas the ordinary court merely at-
tempts to hear evidence and apply law, the family court operates on
a therapeutic treatment principle, the controlling question being not
"who is at fault here" but "what is best for this family?" (3) The
court is provided with a specially-trained staff which acts in an ad-
visory capacity to the judge. Ideally the staff would include the
pediatrician, nurse, psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, psychometrist,
psychiatric counsellor, social caseworker, marriage counselor, group
worker and teacher.9
The function of the staff is to make a thorough investigation of the
family problem presented and recommend to the judge its proper
remedy. If deemed feasible, an effort at reconciliation may be made
through professional guidance and counselling including psychological
treatment. If divorce is thought to be the proper remedy, the effort is
to prepare the parties for post-marriage family adjustment. The over-
all objective of the staff is to solve the family problem rather than
merely to separate or refuse to separate its members.
For the same reasons that a specialized staff is required for family
courts, it is also necessary that the presiding judge not be rotated.
Considerable extra-legal knowledge is necessary for the family court
9 Id. at 320.
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judge to utilize properly the work of his staff. It is also desirable that
the presiding officer be a person having special interest in family
problems. Many judges regard divorce, custody, alimony, and non-
support as among the most vexing problems facing the judiciary, and
do not enjoy working in domestic relations. This may derive from the
fact that judges are usually lawyers first, and many lawyers feel that
domestic relations litigation is less respectable than the balance of law
practice. Here again, conflicts in philosophy may arise between suc-
ceeding judges dealing with the same family. For these reasons it is
generally agreed that the family court judge needs to be something of
a specialist and should not rotate.10
II
Advantage of Family Courts
One major advantage of the family court is that it appeals equally
to conservatives and liberals on the question of divorce reform. It
makes divorce neither harder nor easier to obtain. It insures that
divorce will be granted only after a competent investigation of the
family problem, but that it will be granted if a thorough analysis
shows its desirability. In this sense the family court is a compromise
which largely displaces objections to other types of reform.
Its unique attribute of centralized control of family matters is a
large factor in making the family court attractive. -Often juvenile
delinquency, nonsupport, divorce and other related problems will
arise in a given family due to one basic cause, such as alcoholism or
poverty. If one court with one inter-working staff can sift through
these cases, it is more likely that a satisfactory solution of all these
problems can be found, be it divorce or therapy, without duplication
of effort within the legal system and a series of expensive lawsuits by
the family members. Unification of effort in the legal system would be
a boon to overworked courts, and the less expensive remedy available
to individual families would in some degree offset the cost to society
of maintaining a family court with its specialized staff. One writer
has estimated that the family court would more than pay its own
expenses through reduction of alcoholism, narcotic use, delinquency,
mental disturbance and other expensive social problems.,'
Further, centralized control avoids conflicts of philosophy between
judges in separate cases involving the same family problem. Very
lo Alexander, What Is a Family Court, Anyway?, 26 Conn. Bar. Jour., 256
(1952).
i Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability,
9 Vand. L. Rev., 637 (1956).
1957]
KENTucKY LAW Jou NAL
little can be done toward reconciliation in a divorce case if the hus-
band is under indictment for nonsupport or desertion in a criminal
court with a non-cooperative judge.
The atmosphere of a family court is conducive to successful recon-
ciliation. The parties come into court as partners, looking for help,
rather than as opponents in a court battle. They tell their stories in
conference and an investigation is conducted, without benefit of cross-
examination and recrimination. The bitterness of a public accusatory
trial is avoided, and experts are on hand to guide the proceedings in
quiet channels.
It is better that child custody be determined by a trained judge in
consultation with a staff of experts on child care and development than
by the ordinary judge whose knowledge in matters extra-legal may
be insufficient. Otherwise the welfare of the child is subject to the
decision of one who is ill-informed, or is determined by common-law
rules which may be wholly outdated by recently developed knowledge
in fields other than law.
III
Problems of Family Courts
In actual practice, the efficacy of family courts is hampered by
inadequate staffing and inadequate jurisdiction.' 2 The staff required
for highest efficiency is rather large and composed of highly trained
personnel. Financial considerations lead inevitably to a whittling
down of the staff. Just as an army with popguns could make only
token resistance in the field, a family court with a skeleton staff can
do too little in dealing with family breakdown. Authorities have
determined that one caseworker can efficiently handle not more than
forty cases simultaneously, but in a number of courts one worker is
obliged to handle eighty, ninety or even one hundred cases.' 3 The in-
formation thus obtained is sketchy and superficial, causing ill-informed
decisions. In such a situation, the money spent for a staff is largely
wasted since the overburdened caseworker must do something on each
case and therefore can rarely treat any case adequately.
To illustrate, in Oregon, two counties, Multnomah and Marion,
have family courts. The Multnomah Court is fairly well staffed and
placed in a model physical plant, but the Marion County Court has a
total of one secretary and three probation officers for a staff, and its
physical facilities have been termed "undesirable" and "inadequate".14
Such a court as the Marion County Court cannot justly be called a
12Supra Note 10 at 263.
l3 Baber, supra Note 1 at 668.
14 Johnstone, supra Note 1 at 819, 820.
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family court and its results are not a fair indication of the family
court's utility. Because many skeleton courts like this are in operation
throughout the country, it is almost impossible to get any clear
statistical picture of family courts and their efficiency.
The second discrepancy between the ideal and the actual occurs
in jurisdiction. It is imperative that a family court be integrated. Over-
lapping jurisdiction means trouble, usually caused either by conflicts
of philosophy between family court judges and old-guard judges or by
one court's operating on one family problem while another works on a
different problem of that family, with neither knowing what the other
is doing.'5
In Ohio, where family courts exist in eight of the nine largest cities,
the family court has either exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of all
family problems other than adoptions.' In the matters where con-
current jurisdiction exists the family court exercises exclusive jurisdic-
tion by tacit consent of the other tribunals.17 The Ohio situation is
probably the best in the United States from the standpoint of jurisdic-
tion due to the "gentleman's agreement" which gives the family courts
almost exclusive jurisdiction in fact, although much jurisdiction is
theoretically concurrent. In contrast to Ohio is the existing situation in
Richmond, Virginia, where some family problems may be brought in
any of five separate courts.'8 Here coordination is supremely difficult
if not impossible.
Situations falling somewhere between these two are common
throughout the country, and also contribute to make statistics on family
courts unreliable. The family is a treatment unit. Family courts have
been set up to look after family welfare only to find themselves denied
a certain amount of jurisdiction or sharing it with ordinary courts.
Any appraisal of existing family courts must take into account the
fact that no family court has yet been established with exclusive juris-
diction of family problems and a complete staff.1 The efficiency of
existing courts is correspondingly diminished.
IV
Objections to Creation of Family Courts
An inevitable obstacle confronting family courts is the expense of
maintaining the large specialized staff. It has been estimated that an
15 Supra Note 10 at 258-56.16 Id. at 251.
17 Ibid.
18 Alexander, The Family Court of the Future, 86 J.A.J.S. 89 (1952).
19 Johnstone, supra Note 1 at 297, 822.
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adequate family court staff would be more costly than the very best
present day juvenile court staff.20 However, there are compensations
which should greatly diminish, if not completely over-ride, the ex-
pense objection.
In jurisdictions where juvenile courts already exist, the cost of
establishing a family court is not great. The juvenile court staff, if it
is adequate, comprises the bulk of the family court staff. A widening
of jurisdiction plus the addition of a few staff members is all that is
needed. As noted before, there are other savings to be effected by the
family court which cut down on the cost of its maintenance. Reduc-
tion of expensive social problems and unification of effort in the legal
system and in individual families must be considered. Of course such
savings are directly affected by the adequacy of the court in terms of
staffing and jurisdiction.
Whether the family court is a money-saving device is at least
debatable. But whether it is expensive or not, the need overbalances
the cost. The American Bar Association, in unanimously approving
family courts in the United States, has said that "the cost of our
present divorce system in terms of human tragedy has become too high
to be tolerated any longer."2'
Perhaps the most potent objection to the family court is that it
permits the state to interfere too much with the individual. Family
court procedures will necessarily involve deep investigation into the
family unit, both through social workers and through psychological
probing. These methods may be necessary to ferret out the true causes
of family discord and the resulting divorce, delinquency, or other
problem. Rehabilitation when possible is the aim of family courts,
and this may sometimes require psychiatric treatment of personality
factors causing disharmony. It has been pointed out that there is
danger here of interfering with basic rights of personal freedom. 22
When parties voluntarily choose to undergo treatment, no con-
stitutional objections can be raised. Probably the greatest number of
divorce cases will be in this category, since very few couples actually
want a divorce. Most of those who apply are doing so only as a last
resort. They are sick, troubled people, disillusioned and in need of
help. Many parties file divorce suits either in temporary anger or in
the mistaken hope of bringing the other party "to his senses", and
follow through with the action because of personal pride.23 A chance
to stop and submit to arbitration is usually welcomed. This conclusion
20 Id. at 322.
2173 Reports of the American Bar Association 305 (1948).22 Supra Note 11 at 637-40. 23 Jour. Bar. Assn. D. C. 5 (Jan. 1954).
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is borne out by the experience of the Conciliation Court in Los
Angeles.24
May parties who are unwilling to submit to family court methods
be forced to undergo extensive examination of their private affairs and
possible psychiatric treatment involving personality change as a con-
dition precedent to a divorce? Indeed this is a difficult question, and
if answered in the negative will destroy much of the value of family
courts. However, it is the opinion of the writer that parties can be
compelled to go through family court without any violation of funda-
mental rights. Primarily, this is a question of degree. A rule of reason
is indicated. In a society such as ours, no legal right is perfect and
absolute. Although a man's right to be inviolate in his person is one
of the most closely protected rights known to the law, circumstances
have and will occasionally warrant a measured invasion, for the good
of the state and the whole people. Interests must always be balanced
in deciding such legal questions, and it is inevitable that in this
process a situation will now and then emerge requiring some abroga-
tion of personal freedom.
Examples of such situations are readily found in the cases on con-
stitutional law. Incarceration for criminal conduct or insanity, and
quarantine of persons having contagious diseases are well-known and
accepted invasions of liberty. Compulsory vaccination 5 and even
compulsory sterilization of mental incompetents2 have been allowed
where the good of the whole society was in jeopardy.
In the present question it is necessary to balance the interest of the
state in family stability and the interest of other family members in
the preservation of their home against the interest of a recalcitrant
individual in the freedom of his person. It is obvious that freedom
of the person must yield to a certain reasonable extent. The degree to
which this freedom must give way is a matter to be determined in
each individual case. Only the broader limits can be seen in specula-
24 The Conciliation Court resembles a true family court only in approach.
It is not staffed to provide such help as a family court would give, and it takes
divorce cases only by consent of the parties. More than a thousand couples per
year appeared before this court in 1954 and 1955, and conciliations were effected
in 43% of these cases, without benefit of a trained staff. The voluntary ap-
pearance of so many couples in a court of conciliation shows that the constitu-
tional objection applies only to a limited class. See, Burke, An Instrument of
Peace: The Conciliation Court in Los Angeles, 42 A.B.A.J. 621 (1956). Also
relevant is the experience of the Family Part of the New York County Supreme
Court, created September 1, 1955. This tribunal operates with only one social
worker on an outside referral basis. Cases are taken on a consensual basis. A
recent report states, "There have been some refusals, but in the main consents
have been given." 12 N.Y.C. Bar Assn. Record 100 (1957).25 Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law 730 (1939).26 Supra Note 25 at 731.
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tion. When children are present in a marriage sought to be dissolved,
it would seem that a strong public policy would call for substantial
interference with the parent's right to immunity. On the other hand, it
is doubtful that such strong methods as brain surgery could ever be
allowed.
Probably the fear of deep personality transformation is not too well
founded. Failures to adjust in marriage often arise from fairly trivial
beginnings. Sometimes all that is needed is an objective view of the
problem presented by an impartial third party. Minor counsel and
guidance may be sufficient. The family court seeks merely to iron out
difficulties, not to turn out a succession of wooden men, equally
balanced and having identical personalities.
Another objection is that the family court removes domestic rela-
tions from the province of the legislature and turns over to judicial
discretion a matter which has so far been dependent on clear-cut rules
of law. It is contended that a government of laws is superior to a gov-
ernment of men. However true this premise may be in the abstract,
it has been a miserable failure when applied to divorce. These very
"clear cut rules of law" have resulted in a degree of collusion and
underhanded practices so outrageous as to render divorce a public
joke and the judge and his laws mere bystanders to the whole affair.27
This is not the first instance in which it has been deemed wise to give
a judge, board, or commission needed authority to control a flexible
situation. Decisions such as this must be made in light of history and
fact, not in terms of pure abstraction. A government of laws is gen-
erally better, but this rule finds its exception in family cases.
Finally, it is argued that the family court arrives too late on the
scene of marital discord. When a couple have gone so far as to actually
fle suit for divorce, can anything constructive be done? Although it is
unquestionably harder to cure a festered wound than a fresh cut, this
does not mean that the job is hopeless. Again, reference is made to
-the suggestion that most people don't want to be divorced at all, but
27 See Baber, supra Note 1 at 522-28 which states:
"Our divorce laws are a mess, they are rotten, they have
totally failed to accomplish their disclosed objective (quoting a re-
port of the A.B.A. Special Committee on Divorce and Marriage
Laws)....
"Divorce procedure has become so routine that it might
be called a legal farce....
"There is little majesty in the law when confusion, evasion,
judicial indifference, and stark dishonesty reign supreme."
Also see Reginald H. Smith, as quoted in 34 A.B.A.J. 196 (1948):
" . . the press and periodicals treat the divorce laws, including the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, with outspoken
contempt, ... "
[Vol. 46,
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are merely seeking a solution. To them, an alternative less drastic than
divorce is welcome. The records of the Los Angeles Conciliation Court
and the New York Family Part noted before bear out this conclusion.
The family court may be the ideal, rather than the worst place for
counseling, since the parties are usually at the end of their ropes, under
emotional strain, and encountering their first opportunity for capable
outside help. The family court provides a friendly atmosphere rather
than the bitterness of an open court battle, which would have an ad-
verse effect on conciliation efforts. Then, too, the family court's work
is not entirely conciliation of divorce cases. In addition to the numer-
ous family problems outside of divorce, the court performs a valuable
function in counseling parties to prepare them for separation and
divorce.
Conclusion
The family court, properly staffed and given adequate jurisdiction,
should merit legislative attention as the only available remedy for a
major national problem. State legislatures should seriously consider
the adaptability of the family court in particular jurisdictions.
Divorce itself is not the problem. It is sometimes the most sensible
solution to a bad marriage. Children are often more harmed by living
in an air of constant conflict than by a separation of the parents. The
malady of domestic relations is that its law is intrinsically poor and
badly administered. The method used to determine who should have
a divorce or custody of children is antiquated, bearing more re-
semblance to trial by ordeal than to modem legal theory. Further,
even if the laws were perfect, the facts in actual cases are easily hid-
den from the courts. The adversary system fails here.
The integrated family court, with access to all family problems,
is the best answer yet provided. It is the logical outgrowth of the
juvenile court, and exists for the same reasons. A family court system
would rid the legal world of the stigma it now bears as a rather
inept and fumbling organization so far as divorce goes. Divorce laws
simply do not work. They are drawn to fit an adversary scheme, which
too often does not exist, and they cannot successfully be applied. Law-
makers have tried to draft divorce laws to fit the traditional system
for want of a better frame.
The family court may or may not be an expensive remedy. A con-
clusion on this point would be pure speculation. But expensive or
not, it appears to be the only workable solution for an urgent problem.
Cost may be measured in money or in human happiness; if measured
in the latter, a saving is inevitable.
Jesse S. Hogg
